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Foreword
Fraud is a challenging problem. Its 
economic effects are clear – worse 
public services, less financially stable 
and profitable companies, diminished 
levels of disposable income for all of 
us except the fraudsters. However, 
historically, fraud has been described 
as ‘difficult to cost’¹ and, until relatively 
recently, it has not been possible to 
quantify these effects. However, the last 
decade has seen this situation change. 
In the UK, from the late 1990s, the 
Department of Work and Pensions and 
the NHS started to accurately measure 
fraud (and error) losses. In 2006, the 
Government’s ‘Fraud Review’ Report 
said, ‘better measurement is crucial to a 
properly designed and effective strategic 
response to fraud and to supporting 
better management of fraud risks’ and 
the new National Fraud Authority now 
has a specialist unit devoted to this task. 
Furthermore, the National Audit Office’s 
2008 ‘Guide to Tackling External Fraud’ 
said, ‘Assessing the scale of loss from fraud 
is an important first step in developing 
a strategy for tackling external fraud‘. 
In Europe, the European Healthcare 
Fraud and Corruption Declaration of 
2004, agreed by organisations from 28 
countries, called for “The development 
of a European common standard of risk 
measurement, with annual statistically 
valid follow up exercises to measure 
progress in reducing losses to fraud 
and corruption throughout the EU.”
In America, the Improper Payments 
Information Act of 2002 provided 
that public agencies should publish 
a ‘statistically valid estimate’ of 
the extent of fraud and error in 
their programs and activities.
As a result, many more exercises 
to measure losses have taken 
place than would otherwise be the 
case. For the first time, this Report 
documents what has been found.
Of course, there are still some estimates 
published which are simply not reliable. 
Counting only those losses which are 
detected, or surveying those working in 
the area for their opinion, will never be 
accepted as a reliable indicator of the 
real economic cost of fraud. This Report 
takes the debate much further forward.
It shows that the financial cost of fraud 
and error can be accurately measured in 
the same way as other business costs; 
it shows that this is not unnecessarily 
costly or difficult; and most importantly it 
shows what the financial cost is likely to 
be. It also documents how measurement 
of losses has helped to reduce them.
The audit on the volume of data, the total 
value of the expenditure concerned, the 
number of different types of expenditure 
and the different organisations and 
countries concerned is impressive. 
It will take a brave Chief Executive 
of either a public or private sector 
organisation who argues that their losses 
are outside what this Report finds to be 
the case – two thirds of the exercises 
reviewed showed losses of between 3 – 
9%, with an average of just over 4.5%.
It would be important at any time 
to counter fraud on this scale.  It 
becomes doubly so in an age of major 
public expenditure cuts which will 
ricochet into the private sector.
Right Honourable Frank Field M.P.
¹ “Counting the costs of crime in 
Australia: a 2005 update” – The 
Australian Institute of Criminology.
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lntroduction
This Report, for the first time, collates the 
latest, accurate, statistically valid information 
from around the world about the real 
financial cost of fraud and error. Once the 
extent of fraud losses is known then they 
can be treated like any other business cost 
– something to be reduced and minimised in 
the best interest of the financial health and 
stability of the organisation concerned. 
lt becomes possible to go beyond reacting to 
unforeseen individual instances of fraud and 
to include plans to pre-empt and minimise 
fraud losses in business plans. 
Data from around the world
The Report doesn’t just look at detected 
fraud or the individual cases which have 
come to light and been prosecuted. 
Because there is no crime which has a 100% 
detection rate, adding together detected 
fraud significantly underestimates the 
extent of the problem. It is also the case 
that if detected fraud losses go up, does 
that mean that there is more fraud or that 
there has been better detection; equally, if 
detected fraud losses fall, does that mean 
that there is less fraud or worse detection?
The Report also doesn’t rely on survey-
based information where those involved 
are asked for their opinions about the level 
of fraud. These tend to vary significantly 
according to the perceived seriousness 
of the problem at the time by those 
surveyed. While they sometimes represent 
a valid survey of opinion, that is very 
different from a valid survey of losses.
Instead, this Report considers and analyses 
132 exercises which have been undertaken 
around the world during the last ten 
years, to accurately measure the financial 
cost resulting from fraud and error. 
The difference between previous 
guestimates of fraud losses and 
the data from the statistically valid 
and accurate exercises reviewed 
in this Report is equivalent to the 
difference between navigation by the 
stars and navigation by satellite.
This is surely the worst aspect of the 
problem. Yes, fraud is unethical, immoral 
and unlawful; yes, the individuals who 
are proven to have been involved should 
be punished; yes, the sums lost to fraud 
need to be traced and recovered. However, 
these are actions which take place after 
the fraud losses have happened – after 
the resources have been diverted from 
where they were intended and after 
the economic damage has occurred. 
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Measuring fraud and error costs
In almost every other area of business 
life, organisations know what their costs 
are – staffing costs, accommodation 
costs, utility costs, procurement costs and 
many others. For centuries, these costs 
have been assessed and reviewed and 
measures have been developed to pre-
empt them and improve efficiency. This 
incremental process now often delivers 
quite small additional improvements. 
Fraud and error costs, on the other 
hand, have only very rarely had the same 
focus. The common position has been 
that organisations have either denied 
that they had any fraud or planned only 
to react after fraud has taken place. 
Because of this, fraud is now one of 
the great unreduced business costs.
However, a cost can only be reduced if it 
can be measured, and a methodology to 
do this accurately has only been developed 
and implemented over the last decade.
Reducing the financial cost of fraud
Now that we can measure fraud and error 
losses, we can make proper judgements 
about the level of investment to be made in 
reducing them. Now that we can measure 
these losses, we can measure the financial 
benefits resulting from their reduction.
In the current tough business climate, 
reducing these losses is one of the least 
painful ways of reducing business costs. 
The British Prime Minister, Gordon Brown, 
has recently referred to the need to reduce 
‘unnecessary’ public expenditure and it is 
very difficult to describe fraud as necessary. 
Much fraud is ‘unnecessary’ because it can 
be pre-empted. This Report identifies what 
the financial cost of fraud and error has 
been found to be and thus, the ‘size of the 
prize’ to be achieved from reducing them.
Of course, there is always more research 
to be done and any organisation should 
consider what its own fraud and error 
costs are likely to be, however, the 
volume of data which is already available 
from exercises covering almost £800 
billion, points clearly to losses usually 
being found in the range of 3-9%.
We will continue to monitor data as 
it becomes available and publish 
further Reports as appropriate.
Jim Gee
Director of Counter Fraud Services,
Maclntyre Hudson LLP
This Report has reviewed 132 exercises to 
accurately measure fraud and error losses, 
covering 32 different types of expenditure 
totalling almost £800 billion, in 44 
organisations from 9 countries. Including 
the types of expenditure where exercises 
have been repeated, they have examined 
a total of expenditure valued just under 
£3 trillion, sterling equivalent. The value 
of the expenditure examined has not been 
uprated to 2009 values.
This Report is based on extensive 
global research, building on previously 
established direct knowledge, to collate 
information about relevant exercises. The 
data was then analysed electronically. 
Exercises were collated from Europe, North 
America and Australia and New Zealand. 
None were found in Asia or Africa.
Setting high standards
The Report has excluded guesstimates, 
figures derived from detected fraud 
losses, and figures resulting from 
surveys of opinion. It has also excluded 
some loss measurement exercises 
where it is clear that they have not 
met the standards described below.
It has included exercises which
have considered a statistically valid •	
sample of income or expenditure
which have sought and examined •	
information indicating the presence 
of fraud, error or correctness in 
each case within that sample
which have been completed •	
and reported
which have been externally validated•	
which have a measurable level •	
of statistical confidence
which have a measurable •	
level of accuracy
Caveats
There are a number of caveats.
Some of the exercises have resulted in 
estimates of the fraud frequency rate, some 
of the percentage of expenditure lost to 
fraud, and some have measured both.
It is also the case that, some exercises 
have separately identified measured 
fraud and error and some have not. 
In some cases, there have been repeated 
exercises to measure fraud and error losses 
in a single area of expenditure. To avoid 
skewing the overall results by including a 
disproportionate quantity of data from one 
source, only the results from the first and 
most recent exercises have been included. 
In most of these instances, fraud and error 
losses have been significantly reduced 
since the initial measurement exercises.
Sometimes, once such exercises have been 
completed, the organisations concerned 
have, mistakenly in the view of the author 
of this Report, decided not to publish their 
results. Transparency about the scale of 
the problem is a key factor in its solution, 
because attention can be focussed and 
a proportionate investment made.
In some cases, those directly involved 
in countering fraud have decided, 
confidentially, to provide information 
about unpublished exercises for 
wider consideration. In those cases, 
while the overall figures have been 
included in the findings of this Report, 
no specific reference has been made 
to the organisations concerned.
The authors of this Report are also 
aware of a very small number of other 
exercises which have been completed, 
but which have not been published and 
where nothing is known of the findings. 
Finally, it is important to emphasise that 
this research will never be complete. 
More evidence becomes available each 
year. However, the preponderance 
of the evidence does point clearly in 
one direction, as is explained later.
Conclusion
While it is necessary to make these caveats 
clear, the importance of the evidence 
collated in this Report should not be 
underestimated. The evidence shows fraud 
and error losses can be measured – when 
they have been successfully measured so 
many times, in respect of so many different 
types of expenditure, in many different 
organisations and across the world, 
to assert otherwise is the modern day 
equivalent of arguing that the world is flat.
However, even more important is that the 
evidence shows that losses to fraud and 
error represent a significant, damaging 
and, crucially, unnecessary, business cost.
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The nine countries in which the authors 
are aware that fraud loss analysis exercises 
have taken place are:
the UK•	
the United States•	
France•	
Belgium•	
the Netherlands•	
Ireland•	
Canada•	
Australia•	
New Zealand•	
By value of income or expenditure 
measured, the United States has undertaken 
the greatest amount of work in this area. 
This is a direct reflection of the Improper 
Payments Information Act of 2002 (IPIA) 
which requires designated major U.S. public 
authorities to estimate the annual amount 
of payments made where fraud and error 
are present, and to report the estimates to 
the President and Congress with a progress 
report on actions to reduce them.
The guidance relating to the IPIA states 
“The estimates shall be based on the 
equivalent of a statistical random sample 
with a precision requiring a sample of 
sufficient size to yield an estimate with a 
90% confidence interval of plus or minus 
2.5%”². Many U.S. agencies undertake work 
to the higher standard often found in the 
U.K. and Europe – 95% statistical confidence 
and +or- 1%.
In other countries, while there has not 
hitherto been any legal requirement, 
there is a growing understanding that 
the key to successful loss reduction is 
to understand the nature and scale of 
the problem. For example, in Europe, 
the European Healthcare Fraud and 
Corruption Declaration of 2004, agreed by 
organisations from 28 countries called for 
“The development of a European common 
standard of risk measurement, with annual 
statistically valid follow up exercises to 
measure progress in reducing losses to 
fraud and corruption throughout the EU.”³ 
Types of income and expenditure
The range of types of income and 
expenditure where losses have 
been measured include:
payroll•	
procurement•	
housing•	
education•	
social security•	
healthcare•	
insurance•	
tax credits•	
pensions•	
agriculture•	
construction•	
The nature of the figures
Two types of figures have been produced:
a percentage loss rate (PLR - i.e. •	
the proportion of expenditure 
lost to fraud and error)
a fraud frequency rate (FFR - i.e. •	
frequency of fraud and error)
The same exercise can produce different 
PLR and FFR figures. For example, one 
hundred items of expenditure out of a 
thousand worth a total of £100,000 might 
be found to be fraudulent. This would 
produce an FFR of 10%. However, the 
particular one hundred items might have a 
value of £12,000 producing a PLR of 12%. 
The items of expenditure where fraud 
is found to be present may be either 
greater or less than the average value 
of all of the items of expenditure. For 
example, it may be that fraud tends to 
affect items of expenditure that are higher 
than the average value – this will result 
in the PLR being higher than the FFR. 
Indeed, to some extent the findings of 
this research, in general, show just that.
An analysis of the figures has also been 
produced for where losses in the same 
area of expenditure have been measured 
and re-measured. This outlines:
the level of losses when first measured •	
and the level of losses when last 
measured after efforts to reduce them;
Finally, sector-based analysis shows:
the level of losses in key sectors •	
where the most data exists : 
healthcare and social security.
There is more research still to be done 
and it is intended that this Report will 
be updated on a regular basis.
² Appendix C to Office of Management 
and Budget Circular A-123
³ European Healthcare Fraud and 
Corruption Declaration 2004
Data from around the world
The percentage of expenditure lost to fraud 
(and error) ranged between 0.13% and 
10.6% with an average loss of 4.57%.
66% of the exercises showed PLR figures of 
more than 3%.
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The range of fraud frequency rates (FFR) 
was found to be between 0.47 and 9.6% 
with an average FFR of 4.28%.
91% of the exercises showed FFR figures of 
more than 3%.
. 
Fraud frequency
The financial cost of fraud/10
Where organisations have undertaken 
repeated exercises to measure their 
losses in the same areas of expenditure, 
then the evidence shows that this 
has helped to reduce them. 
The average Percentage Loss Rate (PLR) 
when first measured was 5.4% and when 
last measured was 4.61%. This represents 
an average reduction of just under 15% 
in the measured percentage losses.
Measure to manage
There is considerable data available 
from two areas of public expenditure 
– healthcare and social security.
In respect of healthcare, the average PLR 
is 5.59% and the average FFR is 4.23%. As 
discussed above this does tend to show 
that healthcare fraud involves higher than 
average value items of expenditure. 
In respect of social security, the average 
PLR is 5.57% and the average FFR is 2.1%. 
Like healthcare, this does tend to show that 
social security fraud also involves higher 
than average value items of expenditure. 
Separate reports with detailed analysis 
of healthcare and social security fraud 
data will be published subsequently.
In other areas the data is less extensive 
but consideration will be given to a further 
report with more detailed analyses.
Losses expected to be 3 – 9%
On the basis of the evidence, it is clear 
that fraud and error losses in any 
organisation should currently be expected 
to be at least 3%, probably more than 
4% and possibly as much as 9%. 
However, it would be wrong to go too 
much further in terms of predicting 
where in this range, losses for each type 
of expenditure measured, will be. 
This is because, other than in respect of 
healthcare and social security, the volume 
of data does not warrant this. Also, each 
organisation will have either relatively 
stronger or relatively weaker counter 
fraud arrangements. This factor will 
affect where within the range of expected 
losses, a particular organisation will find 
itself. Separate research, analysing 28 key 
aspects of counter fraud arrangements 
in many organisations continues. 
Predict the likely scale of losses
By combining the data which underpins 
this report and organisation-specific 
information about counter fraud 
arrangements, MacIntyre Hudson is able, 
for the first time, to predict the likely 
scale of losses, the key improvements 
which would reduce them and the 
related cost, for client organisations. 
You can do this on line by visiting
www.macintyrehudson.co.uk/
services/counter_fraud.html
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Sector data
This is the first Report in an area 
where, for too long, the accurate 
measurement of losses has been 
considered either impossible or too 
difficult. The Report proves that it is 
possible. Losses to fraud and error can 
now be treated as a business cost like 
any other – to be tracked and reduced.
It is also the case that work to measure 
losses can be highly cost-effective. 
The extent to which efforts to reduce 
losses are helped by greater knowledge 
about the problem is shown by the 
significantly lower (15%) average level 
of losses where they have been re-
measured over a period of time.
Where losses have been measured, and 
the organisations concerned have accurate 
information about their nature and 
extent, there are examples, especially in 
the UK and U.S. where losses have been 
substantially reduced. These include:
the UK’s National Health Service (the •	
second largest organisation in the 
world) where losses were reduced by 
up to 60% between 1998 and 2006 and 
by up to 40% over a shorter period4;
the U.S. Department for Education, •	
which reduced its losses across a 
$12 billion dollar grant program by 
35% between 2001 and 20055;
the U.S. Department of Agriculture, •	
which reduced its losses across 
a $12 billion dollar program by 
28% between 2002 and 20046;
the UK’s Department of Work and •	
Pensions which has successfully 
reduced its losses in Income Support 
and Job Seekers Allowance by 50% 
between 1997/98 and 2005/067.
Three things are clear:
Losses to fraud and error can be •	
measured – and cost effectively;
On the basis of the evidence it is •	
likely that losses in any organisation 
and any area of expenditure will 
be at least 3%, probably more than 
4% and possibly as much as 9%;
And with the benefit of accurate •	
information about their nature 
and extent, losses can be 
reduced significantly.
In a troubled economic climate, not to 
consider the financial benefits of making 
relatively painless reductions in losses to 
fraud and error seems rather foolhardy.
4 UK NHS Counter Fraud and Security 
Management Service – 1999 – 
2006 Performance Statistics
5 U.S. Department of Education 
Performance and Accountability 
Reports 2001 – 2005
6 U.S. Department of Agriculture 
Performance and Accountability 
Reports 2002 - 2004
7 UK Department of Work and Pensions 
- Fraud and Error in the Benefit 
System April 2005 to March 2006
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Conclusion and recommendations
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Jim Gee is Director of Counter Fraud 
Services at Maclntyre Hudson LLP and 
Chair of the Centre for Counter Fraud 
Studies
Jim Gee is one of the leading counter fraud 
specialists in the UK. His accomplishments 
include leading the team which cleaned 
up London Borough of Lambeth in the mid 
to late 1990s; advising Right Honourable 
Frank Field M.P. during his periods as Chair 
of the House of Commons Social Security 
Select Committee and Minister for Welfare 
Reform; and being Director-General of the 
European Healthcare Fraud and Corruption 
Network between 2004 and 2006. 
He was also a senior advisor to the 
Attorney-General concerning the 
Government’s Fraud Review which has 
started to professionalise this country’s 
approach to fraud. Gee’s work in the NHS 
reduced fraud-related losses by up to 60 
per cent, delivering financial benefits to 
the tune of more than £800 million and 
achieving a 12:1 return on the costs of the 
work. 
Mark Button is a Reader at University 
of Portsmouth and Director of the 
Centre for Counter Fraud Studies
Mark Button is a Reader in Criminology and 
Associate Head Curriculum at the Institute 
of Criminal Justice Studies, University of 
Portsmouth. He has also recently founded 
the Centre for Counter Fraud Studies of 
which he is Director. 
He has written extensively on counter fraud 
and private policing issues, publishing 
many articles, chapters and completing 
four books with one forthcoming: Private 
Security (published by Perpetuity Press and 
co-authored with the Rt. Hon. Bruce George 
MP), Private Policing (published by Willan), 
Security Officers and Policing (Published 
by Ashgate), Doing Security (Published by 
Palgrave), and Understanding Fraud: Issues 
in White Collar Crime (to be published by 
Palgrave in early 2010 and co-authored). He 
is also a Director of the Security Institute, 
and Chairs its Academic Board, and a 
member of the editorial advisory board of 
‘Security Journal’. 
Mark founded the BSc (Hons) in Risk and 
Security Management, the BSc (Hons) in 
Counter Fraud and Criminal Justice Studies 
and the MSc in Counter Fraud and Counter 
Corruption Studies at Portsmouth University 
and is Head of Secretariat of the Counter 
Fraud Professional Accreditation Board 
(CFPAB). Before joining the University 
of Portsmouth he worked as a Research 
Assistant to the Rt. Hon. Bruce George MP 
specialising in policing, security and home 
affairs issues. 
He completed his undergraduate studies 
at the University of Exeter, his Masters at 
the University of Warwick and his Doctorate 
at the London School of Economics. Mark 
is currently working on a research project 
funded by the National Fraud Strategic 
Authority and ACPO looking at victims of 
fraud. 
Graham Brooks is a Course Leader at 
University of Portsmouth
Graham Brooks is Course Leader for the 
Counter Fraud and Corruption MSc. at 
the University of Portsmouth. He was 
previously the Course Leader for the 
Counter Fraud and Criminal Justice Studies 
BA from June 2007 to March 2009, and 
Head of Secretariat for the Counter Fraud 
Professional Accreditation Board from 
September 2007 to March 2009. He is also 
a member of the Centre for Counter Fraud 
Studies at the University of Portsmouth. 
About the Report authors
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Campaigning against poverty and low pay
From 1969-79, Frank Field worked as 
Director of the Child Poverty Action Group, 
during which time it became one of the 
premier pressure groups in the country.
In 1974 he also became Director of the 
Low Pay Unit until 1980. The Unit was 
established to make sure wages councils 
properly protected the rights of workers 
in certain industries. It was the first to 
campaign for a national minimum wage, 
along with Rodney Bickerstaffe, the former 
general secretary of the National Union of 
Public Employees, now Unison; a goal that 
was eventually achieved in 1998.
Parliamentary experience
In 1979, he was elected Member of 
Parliament for Birkenhead and has since 
displayed a unique attachment to his 
constituency. During the 1980s he led 
the campaign to make the Labour Party 
electable, which not only involved the 
very public countering of Trotskyites in 
Birkenhead, but also the development 
of policies which appealed beyond 
the ghettos. To this end, he led the 
transformation of the debate on welfare 
from one that believed in a process of pure 
altruism, to one which had a more sane 
view of human nature.
Between 1980 and 1981 he served as 
Shadow Education and Social Security 
spokesman under the leadership of Michael 
Foot. In 1990 he took up the chairmanship 
of the Social Security Select Committee and 
continued in this role up to 1997. From 
1997-1998 he accepted the position of 
Minister for Welfare Reform in Tony Blair’s 
first cabinet. Since then, he has served as a 
member of the Public Accounts Committee 
between 2002 and 2005.
Other commitments
Outside of Parliament, he is equally busy 
and committed. In 1999 he helped set up 
the Pension Reform Group which he chairs. 
The group has acted as an important 
independent think tank for the cause of a 
long-term, investment led reform to the 
pension system. Between 2001 and 2007 
he chaired the Church Conservation Trust 
helping develop the trust from being one 
primarily concerned with conserving the 
best architectural gems of the Church to 
one which tries to open up such places 
for alternative use. Since 2005, he has 
been chairman of the Cathedral Fabrics 
Commission for England which is the 
planning authority for English cathedrals. 
In 2007 he took on the chairmanship of 
the 2011 Trust which has been established 
to celebrate the 400th anniversary of the 
Authorised Version (King James Version) of 
the Bible.
Right Honourable Frank Field M.P.
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The Centre for Counter Fraud Studies
The University of Portsmouth’s Centre for 
Counter Fraud Studies (CCFS) was founded 
in June 2009 and is one of the specialist 
research centres in the University’s Institute 
of Criminal Justice Studies. It was founded 
to establish better understanding of fraud 
and how to combat it through rigorous 
research. The Institute of Criminal Justice 
Studies is home to researchers from a wide 
cross-section of disciplines and provides a 
clear focus for research, knowledge transfer 
and educational provision to the counter 
fraud community. The Centre for Counter 
Fraud Studies makes its independent 
research findings available to support those 
working in counter fraud by providing 
the latest and best information on the 
effectiveness of counter fraud strategies.
www.port.ac.uk/departments/academic/
icjs/CentreforCounterFraudStudies/
About MacIntyre Hudson LLP
Established in 1880, we are a growing 
and successful mid tier UK independent 
accountancy firm working with 
entrepreneurial businesses, groups and 
multinationals with operations in the UK.
We provide a comprehensive range of 
services and specialist advice, including 
audit and assurance, tax planning and 
compliance for both corporate and individual 
clients, payroll and VAT, corporate recovery, 
business strategy, counter fraud services and 
outsourcing. Other parts of the MacIntyre 
Hudson Group provide specialist advice on 
corporate finance and professional training.
www.macintyrehudson.co.uk
Our membership of CPA Associates 
International Inc. provides multiple 
benefits to our clients. CPAAI is among the 
world’s largest international accountancy 
associations with member firms in major 
business centres around the world. Through 
CPAAI we can offer our clients access to 
international expertise and a broad range 
of accounting and tax specialists with local 
knowledge, expertise and experience.
www.cpaai.com
With nine offices in the UK and associates in 
most of the major cities in Europe, the Middle 
East, the USA, Latin America, across Africa 
and Asia Pacific, we are never far away.
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